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The social shell
Gerry Kearns
Medical geography begins with sickness and health. The policies addressing disease, and the causes promoting good health are, literally, vital. Here, as in social science as a whole, an historical 
perspective helps: Things could have been different and may yet be dif-
ferent again. Parallels between past and present propose lessons for today. 
This approach is well captured in Mitchell Dean’s summary of Michel 
Foucault’s project as the writing of critical and effective history. Critical 
history highlights the contingency of the present, and effective history 
gives us resources with which to consider alternatives. An important and 
contested area that is illuminated by such a “political historicism” is the 
nature of the social.2 This has both a material and a discursive context and 
both are essential for medical geographers.3 Its material setting includes the 
biological conditions of human existence. These conditions are resolutely 
social. Historians influenced by Foucault have described the emergence 
of the social as a distinct field of knowledge, expertise and government.4 
There is now a corpus of important geographical works on the emergence of 
social policy in the areas of health, sickness, welfare, and urban planning.5 
Public health is one area where this discovery and invention of the social 
occurs repeatedly. Far from being the individualistic Robinson Crusoe of 
liberal or bourgeois ideology, human beings require a social shell if they 
are to thrive. 
Medical geography includes the study of the localizing causes of 
disease. There has always been a tension between concentrating on the 
characteristics of the individual and focusing upon conditions beyond the 
control of single individuals, between lifestyle explanations on one hand 
and socio-environmental explanations on the other.6 This has even led some 
medical geographers to call for a geography of health rather than a medical 
geography, seeing the latter as tied to an individualistic, biomedical model 
of sickness rather than embracing the social, environmental and preven-
tive dimensions of the former.7 The first part of the paper examines public 
health discourses as one of the ways “society” is rediscovered. A comparison 
of nineteenth-century British public health discourses with current writing 
about the urbanization of AIDS in the United States shows the repeated 
and contested discovery of the social. The social shell is revealed by the 
personal interdependencies that exacerbate vulnerability to sickness. The 
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second part of the paper explores cyborg urbanism, or the idea that to 
survive in cities, people require sets of material appendages. This technol-
ogy cannot not be provided by and for individuals, but only by and for 
collectivities. The inorganic is itself part of the social shell. The third part 
of the paper considers the question of collective action and the way that 
social movements operate. The social shell, here, consists of solidarities 
cultivated either in place or across space. I conclude by arguing that the 
singular importance of the social in public health underlines the necessity 
for such solidarities. The social shell is vital.
 
discovering society
The tension between individualistic and social explanations is an 
old one. The form this tension takes varies with local circumstances and 
ideologies. In the early nineteenth century, the notion of individual rights 
as a protection against despotic government was prominent in political 
discourse. John Stuart Mill, however, went further and emphasized indi-
vidual rights as defense even against democratic government, the potential 
“tyranny of the majority.”8 Bentham had famously dismissed natural rights 
as “nonsense on stilts.”9 They were, argued Jeremy Bentham, nothing 
more than useful conventions, to be discarded where they did not meet 
the utilitarian test of collective, social usefulness. Mill argued that where 
the actions of an individual affected others, there might be grounds for 
government interference but that the test here would be general utility. 
The utilitarian basis of individual rights, in the case of Bentham, and of 
liberal government interference, in the case of Mill, appeared to promise 
that legal philosophy would seek a secure empirical basis. 
In fact, policies continued to be overdetermined, both by empirical 
arguments and by moral philosophy. Sanitary reform was one such area. In 
ideological terms, there were arguments from contestable first principles. 
On one side, the more individualistic strand in bourgeois thought empha-
sized the idea that individuals, properly trained, could look out for their 
own best interests. This training of the social body is the focus of Mary 
Poovey’s account of sanitary reform.0 Against this was a recognition that 
no person was a sanitary island, entire of themselves. It is in this way that 
the public health movement came to diverse, and contested, constructions 
of the social. This was never simply a matter of mere observation. As 
Chris Hamlin has pointed out, “[i]n this public health some parts of the 
environment (like sewer design) became part of medicine, while others, 
like diet and workplace, disappeared.”2 Hamlin argues that public health 
reform focused on the physical environment in order to divert attention 
from poverty. For some state servants, to accept that poverty predisposed 
people to sickness questioned too much about the Victorian social order, 
and its Poor Law. 
Nevertheless, the idea that sanitary investigations were voyages of 
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discovery was not pure rhetoric. Although the evidence never determined 
the details of policy, there was a clear embarrassment behind the so-called 
“condition of England question.”3 The contrast between national wealth 
and working-class living conditions cried out for explanation. The most 
comfortable explanations would have been both empirically adequate and 
ideologically acceptable. Such explanations were not easily produced. It 
appeared that the rich were not immune to diseases traceable to the living 
conditions of the poor. George Godwin’s famous account of insanitary 
London was called Town Swamps and Social Bridges.4 The interconnected-
ness of city spaces forced middle-class people to a new understanding of 
urban risk.5 It was argued that overcrowding in poor tenements would 
be curtailed only when all landlords were required by law to limit the 
number of people sharing a room. Only inspection would prevent butch-
ers selling foul meat, since poverty constrained the poor to buy whatever 
was cheapest. Water and sanitation were provided most cheaply when 
supplied to all. The sanitary reports from government commissions and 
local government officials collated and repeated the evidence to sustain 
these claims.6 The strict individualism of laissez-faire economics could 
explain these relations only by agreeing that free markets did not operate 
here.7 People were embedded in physical and social environments over 
which they could exercise little control. There was indeed such a thing as 
society. This remains the basis for preventive public health programs and 
is the reason why the so-called New Public Health still looks back to these 
nineteenth-century antecedents.8
Those who wish to minimize state intervention retain the assumption 
that, as Margaret Thatcher asserted, “[t]here is no such thing as society.”9 
Similarly, seeking to justify urban clearance for poor areas of New York in 
966, Roger Starr ridiculed the idea that something as nebulous as “com-
munity” might be harmed in the process: “[p]rovided only that a certain 
homogeneity of social class and income can be maintained, American com-
munities can be disassembled and reconstituted about as readily as freight 
trains.”20 Yet public health risk remains largely social in character. In hazards 
research, geographers and social scientists speak of the social distribution 
of vulnerability.2 This is illustrated very elegantly by a recent study of the 
Chicago heat wave of 995.22 In Chicago, the heat wave of July 995 killed 
about 700 people in one week. When they tried to understand this event, 
epidemiologists focused initially on the characteristics of individuals that 
placed them into risk groups.23 These included poverty, race, and isolation. 
However, they had to control for locality effects in order to isolate the 
individual characteristics that interested them. In later work, when they 
did consider environment, they found that the local homicide rate was 
a highly significant independent variable.24 They offered no explanation 
for this relationship. Klinenberg does. He argues that in areas with lively 
street life provided by street traders and pedestrians, elderly people living 
alone were not afraid to come down and repair to the air-conditioned 
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safety of convenience stores. In contrast, areas swept by drive-by shootings 
and drug-related street crime were considered dangerous by single elderly 
people, who remain in the apparent safety of their apartments. Without 
air-conditioning they were cooked to death in these flats. Klinenberg argues 
that public health officials in Chicago refused to face up to these social 
factors, yet living alone and being afraid of street crime resulted from other 
city policies concerning welfare, urban renewal, the regulation of street 
trading, and policing. Individualistic explanations not only fail to explain 
the observed mortality; they also narrow the search for solutions. The heat 
wave required what Klinenberg terms a “social autopsy.”
Medical geography is well equipped to broach this sort of social 
autopsy. This is a framework suited to the evaluation of fundamental 
geographical change. We may illustrate this briefly by considering the 
consequences of recent transformations of inner city areas in the United 
States. Between 949 and 973, one million people were dispersed as 
some 2,500 neighborhoods in 993 cities were levelled as part of urban 
renewal.25 Renewal concentrated Black people into housing projects and 
then used the land thus cleared for commercial and institutional uses. 
Cities were segmented ever more efficiently into rich and poor districts. 
Black communities lost their historical bearings. Mindy Fullilove calls this 
“root shock.” This urban renewal was replaced in the 970s, 980s, and 
990s by a policy of withdrawing services from the inner city areas where 
the poor lived. Deborah Wallace and Rodrick Wallace show how this 
“benign neglect” produced new depths of segregation and new piecemeal 
urban clearance.26 For New York, they document a policy of withdrawing 
fire services from the neighborhoods of the poor. The fires that ensued left 
an urban landscape fragmented and bedraggled. The abandoned shells of 
damaged buildings became the resorts of drug users. All who could, left. 
All who were left could only watch as the urban pathologies took deeper 
root.
Fullilove argues that people take care of their home place, they have 
a deep knowledge about it, and it is vital to their sense of self. These 
bonds of attachment, familiarity and identity are broken by wholesale or 
piecemeal uprooting of neighborhoods. The resulting trauma produces 
nostalgia, disorientation, and alienation.27 Communities lose their re-
silience and pathologies of crime and addiction arise. These pathologies 
are highest in the areas that have seen the worst urban destruction, and 
in these areas people have a poor self-image, they are demoralized.28 This 
stress has direct consequences for health. The burnt-over areas not only 
have a high incidence of homicide, but they also have a high proportion 
of underweight babies.29 The introduction of HIV into this ecology of 
risk had depressingly predictable results. Not only were the fault lines of 
poverty and degraded environments etched onto the map of AIDS, but, 
in the diffusion that followed the early incubation of the epidemic, the 
suburbs rediscovered their connectedness with the maligned inner city. 
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Wallace and Wallace show that the level of HIV infection in the suburban 
areas of different cities may be explained primarily by the level prevailing 
in the central districts of those same cities. Overall, the connectedness of 
cities with New York and San Francisco was a fundamental factor in their 
vulnerability to HIV. Suburban New Yorkers and the citizens of the rest 
of the urban system of the United States were made vulnerable to AIDS 
by the planned deterioration of parts of Manhattan and the Bronx. Wal-
lace and Wallace conclude that: “[W]e must rebuild communities so that 
substances or compulsive promiscuity are no longer needed (or indeed 
tolerated) to relieve pain. Both economic opportunities and socially 
functional neighborhoods are the best AIDS-prevention programs.”30 As 
in the nineteenth century, the individualistic model fails to address either 
the causes of sickness or any plausible solutions. 
cyborg citizens
Erik Swyngedouw has described cities as assemblages made of natural 
and social elements and, to direct attention to this hybrid nature of the 
city, he refers to cyborg urbanization.3 This adaptation of the ideas of 
Donna Haraway has stimulated a number of studies of the relationship 
between ecology and citizenship in the city. Matthew Gandy has looked 
at sanitary systems as one of the many interfaces between technology and 
the body.32 Gandy has further explored the cyborg metaphor as a way of 
conceptualizing modern urban dilemmas, both physical and imagina-
tive.33 He has also followed Mamdani in identifying water rights as a key 
dimension of urban citizenship.34 Liette Gilbert and Catherine Phillips 
write of socio-ecological citizenship with regard to rights to home and 
water.35 Swyngedouw similarly extends Lefebvre’s reading of the city’s right 
to incorporate access to the necessary material conditions for urban life, 
a “right to metabolism.”36 Conceptualizing rights in the field of health is 
difficult, but Norman Daniels’ formulation of a right to “normal species 
functioning” is most serviceable.37 Like relative definitions of poverty,38 it 
makes reference to social norms (“normal”) and, in tying itself to dis-ease, 
rather than well-being, it is more practical than so-called positive defini-
tions of health such as that of the World Health Organization (“a state 
of complete physical, mental and social well being and not merely the 
absence of disease or infirmity”).39 We might, then, adapt Normal Daniels’ 
conceptualization to the case of what we might call cyborg citizenship. 
The cyborg body should incorporate whatever technology is necessary 
for normal species functioning. This, of course, will vary with wealth and 
expectations but in most circumstances imaginable for Western cities 
will include housing, water, and sewerage services; anything less makes 
normal species functioning, and even civilized life as we expect it, impos-
sible. It is quite clear that no individual could provide these services for 
themselves without the scale economies embodied in collective provision. 
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Furthermore, the only way of ensuring that the negative externalities of 
waste disposal do not infringe upon the rights of neighbors is for there to 
be collective regulation. However, these extensions of Haraway’s ideas by 
Gandy, Swyngedouw, and others raise serious questions about the original 
theory from which they borrow. These questions may be addressed by 
reviewing British public health discourses of the nineteenth century in 
the light of Donna Haraway’s account of the cyborg.
Haraway’s treatment of the cyborg raises two related issues.40 The first 
concerns the nature of human beings. Haraway identified three polarities 
that she thought were destabilized by recent changes; some of which, at 
least, may be described as a shift from an industrial to an information 
economy. These blurred divisions are those between human and animal, 
between animal and machine, and between the physical and the non-physi-
cal. In broad terms, if an individual human being is somehow distributed 
and articulated through a series of physical and biological appendages that 
are not part of its given biology, then the boundary between the human 
and the non-human is called into question. The second is that if the hu-
man being is not bounded in this way, then the question of humanism 
as a theory of social action is also called into question. This remains a 
highly contentious issue in economics and the social sciences, but, if we 
can no longer explain social action exclusively in terms of the motives of 
individual conscious human beings, then methodological individualism is 
untenable.4 A whole series of rather different agents have to be theorized 
and their rules of engagement and forms of calculation explained.42 The 
relations between the first and second propositions appear conditional. 
That is, it is changes in the technology of life that are presented as reducing 
the degree to which social action can be explained by individual humans’ 
preferences, intentions, or projects. This understanding of our current 
dilemma is made questionable by Gandy’s and Swyngedouw’s reworking 
of Haraway’s ideas.
The public health ideology of Edwin Chadwick illustrates the problem 
rather well. Chadwick was an innovator of state institutions, involved not 
only with the New Poor Law of 834 but also with the Public Health 
Act of 848.43 Together these changed the nature of urban governance in 
Britain. In terms of public health, Chadwick believed in circulation.44 He 
thought that stagnation produced decomposition, which in turn produced 
mephitic gases that either directly or indirectly caused disease.45 Thus, waste 
products had to be removed. This could have been done in a number of 
ways. The most common way in the early nineteenth century was for the 
night-soil man to come around from time to time and pump out cesspits. 
Chadwick believed that this was inevitably inefficient and something 
more automatic was needed. For this purpose, he proposed using sewers. 
Previously, sewers were for the drainage of rainwater from streets. Chad-
wick suggested that if sewers took both waste-water from houses and the 
excreta from water closets, they might drain both away from the home. 
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To this end, he wanted people also to get their water not from standpipes 
in courtyards, but by constant, high-pressure supply piped into houses. 
This would ensure that enough water was available in the house to flush 
away the excreta. At the other end of the sewer would be a farm ready to 
be fertilized rather than a river to be polluted. The night soil in suspen-
sion could be spread over the fields and would thus produce food, which 
the urban residents could enjoy. The more residents, the more night-soil, 
the more night-soil, the more food. Chadwick was delighted. He had, he 
said, “realised the Egyptian idea of immortality by putting the serpent’s 
tail in its mouth.” 
In terms of the separations Haraway speaks of, it is clear that this 
ecological thinking treated humans as animals within a web of nature. It is 
significant that it was based upon the Soil Chemistry of Justus von Liebeg, 
for in this way it connected organic and inorganic material. When we recall 
that cholera was the index disease to which the public health ideology 
addressed itself, we can see a certain paradox here. Bourgeois sensibilities 
were obsessive about the control of bodily fluids. Cholera was a disgusting 
and shaming disease.46 It violated the borders of the body as waste prod-
ucts were expelled in uncontrollable spasms. Precautions were needed to 
guard against such animalistic lack of self-control and the associated risk of 
eventual death. Yet the bourgeois body could only be bounded, could only 
control its secretions, by being placed in communion with a network that 
rendered those secretions natural in a good rather than a bestial manner. 
The crucial terms are circulation and conservation. Fluids are disciplined 
and then indirectly re-ingested, the Egyptian idea of immortality.
This providential view of nature was ultimately grounded in a cos-
mology, and Chadwick was explicit about his preference for the natural 
theology of William Paley. This was the idea that the nature of God was 
revealed in the forms of his creation.47 Since God was benevolent so was 
nature. This was very different to the view of nature as fallen Creation in 
which it was anything but providential but was rather miserly in its provi-
sions. Chadwick presented his vision of circulatory sanitation as an explicit 
rebuttal of Malthus. It is also significant that the same vision of conserva-
tion and circulation informed Chadwick’s political economy and that this 
political economy was also important to his public health ideology. 
Individual consumers were unable to secure for themselves the benefits 
of the new sanitary system. Indeed, the market did not seem at all provi-
dential, for it produced obscene profits for water companies that provided 
an appalling service. Once again, Chadwick turned to the idea of circula-
tion. The problem was that water, sewerage, and, at times he would also 
argue, housing were not ordinary commodities. They were commodities 
where neither capital nor consumers were able to enter or leave the market 
at will.48 Once the fixed capital for a water supply had been laid out, the 
pipes were an inflexible investment. They would only be used to deliver 
water. It was, therefore, never worthwhile for a provider to cease providing 
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water at almost any price. This could only be ruinous in the presence of real 
competition since there was no incentive for a provider to leave the market 
rather than reduce the price. The result was that in these cases there was 
collusion between nominal competitors, and prices were fixed way above 
the level at which normal profits were guaranteed. Sewerage systems were 
similarly inflexible. In the case of housing, thought Chadwick, and here 
he anticipated the central findings of the Royal Commission of 885,49 
it was the consumers who were immobile. The workers had to be close to 
work and yet they were poor. The result was that they had no alternative 
but to overcrowd and overpay for the housing available near their jobs. 
Circulation was again the solution for at least the housing crisis. Sub-
urbanization of industry and cheap trains should unclog the city centre. 
Chadwick was a believer in municipal investment for these fixed capital 
projects where the individual consumer could not benefit from an auto-
matic harmony of the socially useful and the economically efficient. He 
believed that socially useful and economically efficient were coincident, but 
he did not feel that all commodities gave rise to markets that could pro-
duce this. Vested interests or monopoly powers prevented freely operating 
markets, and in these cases the municipality must intervene and provide 
the service itself, and through scale economies and by not taking excessive 
profits it could shadow what an effective market would have done.
Let me return now to the two themes identified in Haraway’s work 
on cyborgs and see how they might relate to this public health ideology. 
I am not trying to push back into the nineteenth century the full force 
of her analysis of the implications of the deepening of an information 
society, but nevertheless there are some interesting parallels here. First, 
this is a technological fix for human health. Physical and biological co-
herence cannot be secured by human animals in cities without a series of 
mechanical and biological extensions to their bodies. Without elevators, 
all but the fittest of us would never be able to live or work in high-rise 
buildings. Without drains, sewers, and water pipes we would be repeat-
edly challenged by pathogens that might certainly make life uncomfort-
able and may even make it impossible. The city is a sort of shell. Second, 
this way of looking at the necessary conditions for urban life does indeed 
raise questions about the separations between human and non-human. 
In some ways the human organism is dissolved into a circular ecosystem 
in which it is a component rather than being part of a hierarchical system 
of which it stands atop. 
But Chadwick resists the anti-humanism that deep ecology commits 
some to. The reason for this lies in the way that circulation relates to 
providentialism in his organic metaphor. By basing both economy and 
ecology on a sort of metaphysics of matter, Chadwick can believe that he 
lives in a world designed by God for the purpose of allowing humans to 
“go forth and multiply.” Thus the free market economy is understood as 
being as natural as is the ecosystem. Letting both run freely would allow 
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them to reveal the beneficence of the divine design within both. However, 
monopolies and vested interests interrupt this teleology with appalling 
results for the ecological sustainability of the city. Because the earth has 
been designed for human beings, there is no need to infer or discern dis-
tinct purposes in other agents, animal or institutional. 
Yet the world did not come as clean as Chadwick could think it. His 
belief in the value of town sewage as fertilizer depended upon the nature 
of local soils, the quality of agricultural drainage, the types of crops it was 
economic to grow, and, finally, the ways the sewage was treated to render 
it safe for farm workers to move amidst. In each of these ways, his expec-
tations for the profitable use of town sewage was frustrated. Town and 
country were not so easily made compatible. Calculations about the value 
of town sewage were not seriously prosecuted by Chadwick. He had to 
be right to have faith in his Egyptian idea of eternity. Second, the money 
to be made from selling water was seriously constrained by what the poor 
could pay. Precisely the same problem undermined attempts at housing 
reform. In many cities, it was the industrial demand for water, not least 
for fire prevention that first brought a constant, high-pressure supply.50 
Calculating on the basis of individuals missed the fortunate point that 
there were enterprises with calculations and agency of their own. Third, 
though Chadwick conceptualized society as a group of individuals and the 
economy as effectively a series of petty commodity producers, he knew 
that there were other institutions involved. Laws required parliamentary 
approval, and this required the construction of voting majorities and 
Chadwick was very attentive to the ways that a majority in favor of public 
health reform might be constructed.5 This meant working through parties 
and finding ways of making the message resonate with whatever ideology 
was dominant within the House of Commons at the time. On his Select 
Committees, Chadwick assembled a broad range of ideological opinions. 
He then managed witnesses and evidences in an attempt to secure the wid-
est possible consensus for his ideas. He then briefed journalists in order to 
create a climate of opinion in which it was difficult for opponents to get a 
good hearing. Chadwick wanted to treat parties, newspapers and pressure 
out of doors as extensions of his arm of government. This is not quite an 
information society, but it is certainly a very sophisticated construction 
of a “public opinion” from a diversity of institutions. 
Finally, although Chadwick conceptualized opposition to his plans as 
nothing more than vested interests and implied that these interests were 
vested in scoundrels and greedy men, in fact the notion of vested interests 
took him quite close to an awareness of the autonomous agency of institu-
tions. In parliament his tenure at the General Board of Health was ended 
by what he saw as an unholy alliance of M.P.s holding water company 
shares. With their dividends threatened, these M.P.s resisted Chadwick’s 
call for the municipalization of water companies. Yet we might as easily 
conceptualize this as the agency of the companies themselves deploying 
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dividends to secure the longer-term interests of the enterprise. The center 
of calculation is the company itself. Indeed, the splitting of people into 
at once being individuals and yet also acting as executives of the interest 
of something external to themselves, be it an enterprise or some other 
association, is one important source of the forms of agency that cannot 
be captured by humanism’s behavioral assumptions. Even Chadwick, 
himself, in postulating a collective interest in public health, in fact took 
his standpoint from the Archimedean view of the state itself. Effectively, 
he conceptualized population as a state asset and then acted as if the state 
had an insurance property in that population. Indeed, this utilitarianism 
led him to propose many extremely authoritarian measures that would 
certainly not be viewed as welcome by all the people they were applied 
to. In this way, he foreshadowed the eugenic Fabian position in which 
biopolitics were given very full reign.52 
To conclude, Chadwick’s organic metaphor paradoxically blinded him 
to the necessity of conceptualizing at all carefully the ecological feedbacks 
he implied could be so providential. Although he appeared to be folding 
humanity back into nature, in fact, he projected onto nature human needs 
and assumed they were sustainable. His failure to acknowledge the radical 
otherness and indifference of the natural world was a direct consequence 
of his theology. Furthermore, although he showed a great aptitude for 
manipulating institutional logics and potentials, he continued to believe 
that the individual was the irreducible basis of society. Yet the nature of 
his practice, and of the opposition he faced, showed agents and centers 
of calculation that were not captured by his humanist sociology. In this 
regard, at least, we can push anti-humanism back before the information 
society developments highlighted by Haraway. The implications of this for 
how we conceptualize anti-humanism, the relations between the individual 
and the social, are quite significant. 
Perhaps all forms of “time-space distanciation” undermine the bound-
edness of the individual.53 Writing allows action at a distance and even 
over time. Writing and money allow the development of institutions that 
can be formulated with interests distinctly their own, interests that indi-
viduals serve but do not always own. Politically, this means that reform 
may require changing the rules of institutions rather than altering the 
ideas and motivations of individuals. Institutions and other collectivities 
form an essential part of the context of individual action.54 Explanations 
in the social sciences cannot be bound by the humanist assumption that 
individual actions are all that need to be described and explained. Further-
more, our consideration of what we might call, following Swyngedouw, 
urban metabolism shows that in the transformation of nature there are 
technological arrangements that are so central to sustaining human life 
in cities that it is only as part of such assemblages that people can survive 
urban life. Forging second nature not only produces new biota but also 
creates organisms that can only survive within second nature.55 Alongside 
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animals manufactured, as Haraway describes,56 for specific purposes in 
a laboratory, there are also animals so transformed by selective breeding 
for agriculture that they, too, could not survive without human manage-
ment. We might easily go further and recognize that human beings as we 
know them can also only survive in assemblages of organic and inorganic 
technologies. The city is perhaps the most important of these. 
reconstructivist social Movements
In a recent paper, Arturo Escobar has linked together science studies 
and the study of new social movements.57 Following recent arguments 
in Science and Technology Studies, Escobar argues for a reconstructivist 
agenda for Critical Development Studies. Scholars should examine the 
constitution of social action from local knowledges and broader develop-
ment discourses. The interpellation of individuals is a product of both. 
Non-modernist logics have to understand the effects that continue to be 
produced by colonial difference in order to establish a space for autono-
mous local choice. In articulating the dilemmas of development, Escobar 
is focusing upon knowledge, its production, status, and use. The AIDS 
epidemic is one of the most significant events in the history of human 
populations.58 Responding to AIDS raises acutely the issue of knowledge 
and its deployment. A geographical approach to these matters suggests 
certain ways that Escobar’s account might be revised, particularly with 
regard to how the “local” is conceptualized. In many studies of indigenous 
knowledges, and not just in Escobar’s, there is a danger that identity gets 
conflated with locality and, furthermore, that localities are conceptualized 
in radical separation from broader connections. These two problems mean 
that the nature of solidarities are not explored as broadly as they could be 
and also that the role of unequal exchanges is occluded. Both of these are 
important to the politics of AIDS and are raised by the political programs 
of social movements around the issue.
Constructivist views of science and technology emphasize the role that 
social context plays in the selection and direction of research and develop-
ment agendas. In arguing for a reconstructivist approach in Science and 
Technology Studies, Edward Woodhouse, David Hess, and colleagues argue 
that this insight has two sets of implications.59 The constructivist moment 
is one of research that lays bare the ideological and political content of 
scientific findings and technological solutions. Both are often presented 
as neutral and objective. The reconstructivist moment goes beyond this 
and suggests that academics might consider what priorities and directions 
research and development agendas ought to take. Given the important 
ways development discourses present economic and technological choices 
as precisely neutral and objective, the constructivist moment should clearly 
remain central to any radical, or critical, development studies discourse. 
There continues an urgent need to show in detail how, in particular policy 
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arenas, neutrality masks selectivity. Implicit choices should be made explicit 
so that they might be challenged. At the very least, this sort of critique 
aims to put onto the development agenda the needs of groups not seen as 
having distinct interests when development needs are viewed through the 
neutral spectacles of technocratic common sense. Escobar has in earlier 
work shown very clearly how essentialist understandings of development 
precisely close down this diversity in the name of some master subject 
that is to be the object of development.60 Similar conclusions may be 
reached if we examine other essences such as “the nation” and the way it 
gets invoked as a singular subject in ways that, again, suspend significant 
cleavages and conflicts of interest. Inclusive agendas will have instead to 
be diverse agendas.
The constructivist moment may also be extended to a review of the 
geography of the production of knowledge. Enrique Dussel argues that 
whereas for Europeans, modernity is seen as the inception of emancipa-
tion from superstition and want, for many other peoples modernity is 
about the creation of a world economy with a center located elsewhere.6 
Eurocentrism views the second as a consequence of the first. Rather, Dus-
sel invites us to see the first as the consequence of the second. Europeans’ 
sense of their liberation from want was founded on their appropriation of 
the resources and labor of others under conditions of the most grotesque 
military inequality. In making the world their warehouse and their market, 
Europeans created a global history that they have ever since chosen to see 
as premised merely upon the diffusion of their enlightened ideas to people 
who ought to see accepting those ideas as in their own best interest. In 
privileging the technical and social choices embodied in Western science, 
we reproduce not only the marginalization of other knowledges but also 
a view of the world that treats modernity as primarily about the diffusion 
of ideas and not about the creation of structural inequalities. Yet, it is of 
course those structural inequalities that allow indigenous knowledges to 
be so casually marginalized. Postulated as those who should listen to the 
wisdom of the West, native peoples are not expected to speak for them-
selves. This is precisely the reason why initiatives such as the Honey Bee 
Network are so important for, in networking sites of indigenous innovation 
and expertise, they allow local peoples to profit from the wider adoption 
of their discoveries.62 They can also develop protocols that try to ensure 
that something like internationally recognized property rights attach to 
this creativity. Furthermore, they can campaign for greater investment in 
the pursuit of further creativity by local peoples.
Turning to the second half of the suggestions put forward by Wood-
house and his colleagues, we can see that insofar as the Honey Bee Net-
work has been successful in getting seed capital for indigenous science and 
technology, it is changing the agenda of research and development. It is 
thereby moving towards the reconstructivist moment. It is one thing to 
note how priorities are set by corporate capital or by western academics; 
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it is another to think how priorities should be set. These issues face any 
radical reconstructivist approach to science and technology studies; and 
their importance is clear with respect to the challenges posed by HIV 
and AIDS. 
First, it is not a straightforward matter to answer the constructivist cri-
tique. Certainly, development agendas have been exclusivist by pretending 
to a universalism that seeks to silence all but its master subject. However, 
inclusion sometimes presupposes that we can identify the component 
social groups that should be engaged in dialogue. The dangers of this are 
clear. The discourse of new social movements can sustain a concern with 
civil society that privileges political forms at the expense of content. In a 
study of the political innovations of neo-liberal Bolivia in the 990s, Car-
men Medeiros draws attention to the significance of the distinction Nancy 
Fraser has drawn between recognition and redistribution.63 If inclusion 
is primarily about recognition, it leaves agendas to be framed elsewhere. 
In her account of Bolivia’s Law of Popular Participation, Medeiros shows 
that a small-scale and territorial definition of the local disqualified solidari-
ties based on class and also placed beyond consideration issues that went 
beyond the local. In this way, questions of land reform never made it to 
the development table, and the question of ecological degradation was 
likewise incapable of being articulated. Even were it possible to establish 
something like a parliament of estates that would still presuppose that 
its constituencies could be identified with some confidence. The matter 
that needs to be addressed is the cultivation of solidarities. In the context 
of the funding of research and development, this means that innovative 
institutional forms need to be created so that new solidarities are explored 
and formed in the process of setting agendas. Civil society pulses around 
institutions and these can be designed through being funded.
Second, while the constructivist critique sits well with an account of 
the marginalization of indigenous knowledges by Western technocracy 
and corporate capital, this implicit geography begs a rather dangerous 
primitivism. Fernando Coronil is surely right to call for nonimperial geo-
historical categories.64 In other words, the inevitable border traffic, to refer 
to a perspective elaborated by Mignolo and Escobar,65 between core and 
periphery means that, as Alberto Arce and Norman Long suggest, processes 
of modernity, even considered in its enlightenment ideological form, are 
transformed not only in the core but also in the economic periphery.66 
Bruce Willems Braun has commented upon the risks of primitivising 
indigenous peoples by essentialising their separation from the desires of 
modernity.67 I emphasize desire because it underlines the distance between 
autonomy and isolation. Autonomy implies making choices for yourself; it 
need not imply that one exercises that choice only by refusing engagement 
with external knowledges. A recognition of the extent to which science 
and technology has been transformed in the to-and-fro between core and 
periphery does not mean, of course, that the benefits have likewise been 
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shared promiscuously. 
Turning to the question of HIV and AIDS as a context in which we 
might want to develop a reconstructivist approach to science and technol-
ogy, there are two aspects underplayed in Escobar’s analysis: solidarity and 
core-periphery inter-relations. These may be highlighted by examining 
separately the two main components of strategies to limit the suffering 
caused by HIV and AIDS. First, there must be a policy aimed at prevent-
ing infections; then there must also be a policy for treating the infected 
and later the sick. Prevention is quite specifically about solidarities. People 
need to change their behavior not only for selfish reasons but also out 
of a sense of responsibility toward others, be it their family, their lovers 
or their casual sex or drug acquaintances. There is no question but that 
AIDS prevention policies are frequently hijacked by people who wish to 
use AIDS in order to serve some other moralizing agenda. On occasion, 
people base policies on what they wish were true rather than on the basis 
of direct evidence. This is very clear in relation to sex education for young 
people. As Fungisai Gwanzura-Ottemöller and Mike Kesby demonstrate, 
pundits are inclined to believe that young people are more ignorant than 
they truly are.68 There is also, as Norman Daniels has argued, a refusal to 
do other than assume that sex education promotes early sexual activity.69 
An editorial in The Lancet described the current Bush administration’s 
insistence on abstinence-only HIV prevention education as “one of the 
best examples of ideology impeding sound public-health policy.”70 People 
insist, for example, on the exclusive promotion of abstinence policies in 
the face of overwhelming evidence that while they may protect some who 
postpone and reduce sexual activity in the face of such scary rhetoric, they 
leave the sexually active completely unprotected.7 In fact, many states 
simply distance themselves from dealing with drug users or the sexually 
active and tolerate a shadow state of parallel institutions that are indirectly 
funded.72 The balance between the sexually active and the sexually inac-
tive is an empirical question, but the only societies that have succeeded in 
seriously restricting the size of the second have required unconscionable 
restrictions on the freedom of women and of the young in order to do so. 
At least, the restrictions seem unconscionable to me and nobody pushing 
abstinence policies is bothering to find out if they are unconscionable to 
the women and young people on whom they are being pressed. We know 
that political leadership is vital if prevention messages are to be installed at 
the heart of society.73 This surely means addressing both the advantages of 
reducing partners in contexts where safe-sex cannot be easily institutional-
ized as the norm for sexual activity, as well as promoting condom use in 
contexts where it can be made normal and expected. Social monitoring and 
sanctions depend upon people identifying strongly enough with a group to 
police its norms on behalf of the group as a whole.74 Successful behavioral 
adjustment programs have relied upon cultivating solidarity, from the 
emphasis on being a good mate by discouraging unsafe sex in clubs to the 
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idea that men protect their family by being exclusively condom-users when 
playing away from home. Awareness of risks works most effectively when 
people can find safe ways of still pursuing their desires. Solidarities allow 
people to talk about the compatibility of pleasure with safety: no solidarity, 
no conversation, no change in behavior. Institutions like clubs, bars, and 
clinics can be vital in educating and fostering solidarity. It is clear that “all 
of us, infected or not, low risk or high, bear a responsibility to change our 
attitudes and behaviors that may promote HIV infection. Without this 
balance, calls for personal responsibility become almost indistinguishable 
from that of blaming the victim and are likely to be counterproductive 
to prevention efforts.”75
Prevention is also a technology that has been shaped by core-periphery 
interactions. Many rich countries have been quite successful in cultivating 
solidarities among drug users and also among gay men. Men having sex 
with men, but not identifying as gay, have been more difficult to address 
since they are less likely to engage in the conversations that are fostered 
by the solidarities among men self-identifying as gay.76 Furthermore, 
heterosexual men and women have been very difficult to reach. This is, in 
part, because of puritanical public discourses around sexuality in many 
rich countries. Great Britain, for example, has higher teenage pregnancy 
than many European countries with comparable or higher levels of teen-
age sexual activity. Failures in the use of contraception have been related 
to poor education resulting from a cultural unease with teenage sexuality 
tout court.77 However, it is this very Puritanism that informs the preven-
tion policies the United States now presses upon Africa.78 In contrast, 
many African countries have been much more frank in their treatment 
of sexuality by means of travelling theater,79 and even by means of public 
advertising.80 This has rested in some cases upon the techniques of niche 
advertising developed by corporate capital to sell trainers or soft drinks.8 
In others, it has been the transformation of forms of entertainment more 
easily recognized as traditional. Indeed, in some contexts, social marketing 
has proved to be too “Western” for local Christian opinion.82 
Patterns of sexual activity among young heterosexual people are not 
that different between Europe and many African countries. The sexualiza-
tion of youth culture springs both from libido and from Western-domi-
nated mass media in both contexts. If African countries can learn from 
the rich countries, it will be in the area of regulating the risks of drug use 
and gay sex and, in return, rich countries have much to learn from public 
discourses of sexuality in many African countries. A reconstructivist agenda 
would be about the differential geography of best practice. We must also 
learn the lessons from studies of the cultivation of solidarities together 
with their emphasis on the importance of institutions. Beyond all else, 
the preventive technologies for HIV are predominantly soft technologies 
and rest upon a public recognition that HIV is a general risk and that the 
infected people remain valuable members of society. It is in this respect 
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that treatment is often such an important mark both of the care taken 
of the sick but also of the presence of HIV as an ever-present reality, and 
risk.83 
Turning now to treatment. Organizations like ACTUP (987) and 
later the Treatment Action Group (990) have been very important in 
developing solidarities around the question of access to drugs. In March 
200, the Global Treatment Access Campaign organized demonstrations 
in eight countries to show solidarity with the South African government 
after the government had been taken to court by forty pharmaceutical 
companies protesting its attempt to access generic drugs.84 There can be 
no doubt but that this international solidarity influenced the so-called 
Doha Declaration (November 200) that put a more health-friendly 
interpretation on international patent law.85 In the United States, it was 
in caring for the sick that solidarities such as buddying came to define, 
for some people, a new way of being gay.86 However, it went further than 
this and, in the face of criticisms that it only catered to white, middle-
class gay men, ACTUP and other gay institutions accepted a measure for 
responsibility for fellow sufferers who did not identify as gay.87 In time, 
ACTUP became a part of the shadow state and was a voluntary agency 
receiving government funding to provide services to a clientele that over 
time became as much non-gay as gay. This cultivation of solidarity by 
ACTUP was in fact a laboratory in which caring regimes were developed. 
New forms of hospice care, new practices governing access to trial drugs, 
and new forms of home care were either developed by ACTUP or provided 
in response to its activism. Through solidarities that were ever extending, 
needs were identified and solutions explored. By increasingly making the 
funding of ACTUP dependent upon its providing broad-based communal 
services, the government encouraged the development of this institution 
away from its initial core group toward a more inclusive form of solidarity. 
This development was, by and large, accepted by gay men because they 
could see the force of the critique of earlier exclusiveness. However, to the 
extent that government only responded where HIV threatened its own core 
group of heterosexual, married couples, gay activists and their institutions 
resisted this incorporation. Broader solidarities rest upon political leaders 
embracing diversity in public.
The interaction of core and periphery around treatment issues is quite 
complex. Certainly some of the palliative drugs, such as aspirin for deal-
ing with the symptoms of sickness, are cheap and are even so not widely 
available in poor countries. Other drugs, particularly those that control 
the replication of the HIV virus within the body, are very expensive. Some 
of this expense comes from the intense research effort that went into un-
derstanding HIV as a living entity. However, that research agenda was, as 
many commentators, such as Jon Cohen, have pointed out, also shaped 
by the commercial possibilities of treatments rather than of vaccines.88 It 
is also clear that intellectual property regimes mean that even in the face 
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of the greatest epidemic threat the human race has probably ever faced, 
there is no effective sense in which science and technology can become a 
universal possession. Drug companies have been shamed into providing 
a limited amount of retrovirals cheaply to some African populations, but 
something much more radical is needed. The patents should be bought 
out by a collective agency and the drugs produced as cheaply as possible 
in vast quantities, even if this means that in rich countries, too, people get 
cheap supplies. However, there is an alternative. Generic drugs are being 
produced in Brazil,89 and they could easily be in India. India is a large 
enough market that the WTO might find it difficult to bully it into compli-
ance. And if China were to manufacture generics, there is virtually nothing 
the WTO could do. It is also clear that in the too-slow development of 
vaccines there will be a further to-and-fro between core and periphery, for 
vaccines can only be tested efficiently in places where background levels 
of infection are high enough that some in the trial will be exposed to the 
disease. This means that the bodies of people in poor countries will be 
borrowed by the pharmaceutical companies of rich countries in order to 
develop vaccines.90 The obvious potential injustices in this situation have 
been urged by activists in both rich and poor countries with the result 
that protocols are in place governing the access of people in those poor 
countries to any vaccines that may be produced. The UNAIDS proposed 
protocols rest upon the assumption that “making a safe and effective vac-
cine reasonably available to the population where it was tested is a basic 
ethical requirement.”9 This is not nearly enough, but it does represent 
an example of the normally marginalized being heard both through their 
political leaders and through activist solidarity. In both prevention and 
treatment, solidarities have developed that shape identity at least as pro-
foundly as does the locality.
solidarity and social relations
In this paper I have argued that historical studies in medical geography 
can address some of the central issues in the social sciences. Social rela-
tions were examined in three areas. First, I argued that medical geography 
uncovers a distinctly social environment. It is not at all surprising that 
public health investigations have been seen as central to the development 
of sociology in nineteenth-century Britain.92 Second, in examining the 
relations between technology and the body in urban sanitary systems, I 
have suggested that the phenomena associated with Haraway’s account 
of the cyborg precede the development of an information society. Third, 
in considering how the social construction of knowledge relates to social 
movements around AIDS, I have suggested that solidarity is an important 
dimension in the development of identity. In each of these three sections, 
the status of the individual has been questioned. The interconnectedness 
of people and of people with places is unavoidable. This is not only a 
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methodological issue; it is a political one too. Jonathan Mann, who did 
so much to build a global AIDS campaign, said that solidarity “is based 
on the knowledge that we need the other; that we are in some basic and 
clear way incomplete without the other.”93 There certainly is such a thing 
as “society.” Without it we perish. We enter into social relations with 
other people in order to live. These dependencies and interactions cre-
ate obligations at the same time as this co-operation and co-dependency 
allows for greater physical and biological security. Understanding these 
responsibilities, needs and benefits should be part of the intellectual agenda 
of a critical and effective medical geography.
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